



# MEMIKIRKAN KEMBALI MANAJEMEN KRISIS PASCA PANDEMI COVID-19

(Rethinking Crisis Management in Post COVID-19 Pandemic)

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## *Abstract*

*Crises and crisis management have long been a curiosity among organizational researchers. A number of studies have produced significant findings, both focusing on the causes (antecedents) of crises, the resulting outcomes, and crisis management. But what is the conclusion, or what is the research problem seems to be unresolved. Likewise, future research directions are difficult to understand because research in this field tends to be scattered and fragmented. Based on ideas from Bundy et al (2017), this article suggests an integrated framework for managing crises by referring to various studies in an effort to solve this problem. This article distinguishes two main viewpoints in the literature on crisis management. First, the perspective is centered on the management of external stakeholders and the second is centered on the dynamics of the internal crisis. Finally, this article suggests a number of potential study topics for academics interested in exploring crises and crisis management using the suggested integrative framework.*

## Abstrak

Krisis dan manajemen krisis telah lama menimbulkan rasa ingin tahu di kalangan para peneliti organisasi. Sejumlah riset telah menghasilkan berbagai temuan signifikan, baik yang berfokus pada penyebab (anteseden) krisis, akibat (*outcome*) yang dihasilkan, maupun manajemen krisis. Namun apa yang menjadi kesimpulan, atau apa yang menjadi masalah penelitian tampaknya belum terselesaikan. Begitu pula arah riset masa depan menjadi sulit dipahami karena penelitian di bidang ini cenderung masih tersebar dan terfragmentasi. Berdasarkan gagasan dari Bundy et al (2017), artikel ini menyarankan suatu kerangka kerja terpadu untuk mengelola krisis dengan mengacu pada berbagai studi dalam upaya untuk memecahkan masalah ini. Artikel ini membedakan dua sudut pandang utama dalam literatur dalam upaya penanganan krisis. Pertama, sudut pandang yang berpusat pada pengelolaan pemangku kepentingan eksternal dan kedua berpusat pada dinamika krisis internal. Terakhir, artikel ini menyarankan sejumlah topik studi potensial bagi para akademisi yang tertarik untuk mendalami krisis dan manajemen krisis dengan menggunakan kerangka kerja integratif yang disarankan.

**Keywords:** crisis, management, organization, perception, integrative framework

## INTRODUCTION

An incident that managers and stakeholders regard as being highly relevant, unexpected, and potentially disruptive is referred to as an organizational crisis as it may jeopardize an organization's objectives and have a significant impact on stakeholder relations (Bundy et al, 2017). These implications have prompted organizational research from a range of disciplines to pay close attention to crises and crisis management, attempting to comprehend how and why crises occur as well as how organizations might manage them to lessen harm (Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015). In addition, organizational learning and adaptation, financial performance and survival, stakeholders' opinions of the organization's reputation, trust, and legitimacy have all been taken into account in organizational research (Bundy et al, 2017).

However, recent ideas suggest that we have only just begun to scratch the surface in our knowledge of crises and crisis management, despite continuous attention across different disciplines. This motivates greater investigation of the theoretical mechanisms at play (Coombs, 2010). Additionally, considering that many of the conclusions and recommendations in this field of study are based on case studies, the research in this field has come under fire for lacking theoretical and empirical rigor (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013). Finally, many academics continue to observe that possibilities to develop cross-disciplinary scholarship are frequently missed by researchers with various views (Kahn et al., 2013). As a result, there is minimal agreement and interdisciplinary integration, there are many, often contradictory recommendations, and discussions on the pertinent antecedents, processes, and results connected to crises and crisis

management persist.

First, we examine and synthesize the literature on crises and crisis management from several disciplines. Second, we advance knowledge by defining a framework that combines two widely accepted viewpoints from the literature. Whereas the second perspective is outwardly focused on managing stakeholder relationships, the first perspective is inwardly focused on the technical and structural factors of a crisis. Our analysis shows that these viewpoints have mostly evolved separately, and we find many possibilities for integrating them. In the end, our framework provides a useful tool for practitioners as well as a foundation for future cross-disciplinary study.

## **METHODE**

We conducted a thorough and integrated search of publications from key organizational academic journals as part of our review. We utilized the Bundy et al. (2017) article 'Crises and Crisis Management: Integration, Interpretation, and Research Development' as our beginning point because it served as the basis for later advances in the field. We carried out full-text searches on the terms crisis, crises, and crisis management to find pertinent articles. Then, in order to create a list of articles for inclusion, we determined and organized crucial themes. This required eliminating papers whose research questions, hypotheses, or propositions did not primarily focus on crises or crisis management. By looking through the references of the publications found in our original search and looking for research that mentions these articles, we also expanded our methodology (Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 2013; Short, 2009). This prompted us

to include a number of significant books, pertinent pieces from other reputable periodicals, and research from the fields of communication and public relations. Overall, we aimed to compile the literature that management and organizational researchers would find most useful.

The internal and external perspectives have mostly developed independently, although sharing some fundamental presumptions and similarities that we outline below. As a result, we center our analysis around these two dominating viewpoints and point out several integration potentials. Our framework is based on Bundy et al. (2017) and divides the literature into internal and external views. It is organized around the three main stages of a crisis—pre-crisis prevention, crisis management, and post-crisis outcomes. Table 1 provides a summary of the papers included in our review; other tables are accessible in the online appendix. In the first stage, which we refer to as the precrisis prevention stage, we study the research that has looked at how organizations might lessen the likelihood of a crisis. We particularly emphasize research on stakeholder interactions from an external perspective and research on organizational preparedness from an internal one. Second, we concentrate on the crisis management stage, which takes into account the decisions made by managers right after a disaster. 1 Our assessment of the literature has led us to the conclusion that the external viewpoint is concerned with stakeholder views of the crisis, whereas the internal perspective is concerned with crisis leadership. Our model's third element focuses on the post-crisis outcomes stage. While literature from an external perspective emphasizes social evaluations as outcomes, literature from an internal perspective has underlined the importance of organizational learning after a crisis.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

### Pre-crisis Prevention

The work of Perrow (1984) and others is frequently referenced in pre-crisis preventive research from an internal perspective to underline the inevitable nature of crises due to the complexity of contemporary organizational life. We focus on two key issues: arranging for dependability and the contributions of organizational culture and structure to crisis preparedness. High-reliability organizations are the subject of one prominent line of research (Bigley & Roberts, 2001). This stream's main thesis is that companies can position themselves to avoid system failures that could trigger crises. In this respect, a high-reliability business has the capacity to handle unforeseen situations, which comes from a collective managerial „mindfulness“ process in both cognitive and behavioral terms (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Bigley and Roberts (2001), for instance, concentrated on three facets of high-reliability organizations: mechanisms that permit the modification of formal structures, leadership support for improvisation, and strategies that enable improved sensemaking.

Other researchers have concentrated on the elements that could hinder an organization's capacity to organize for reliability, including the emotional and cognitive limitations of managers (Kahn et al., 2013), the frequency of organizational disruptions (Rudolph & Repping, 2002), the availability and use of organizational resources (Marcus & Nichols, 1999), and the functions of the practices and structures used to support reliability (Lin et al, 2006).

Additionally, internal research has identified characteristics

such as an organization's culture, governance, and remuneration structure that may increase the likelihood of crises (Greve et al, 2010). For instance, Ashforth and Anand (2003) claimed that a company's culture can be more tolerant of wrongdoing, which frequently results from managerial ambitions or power struggles. Similar to this, Schnatterly (2003) discovered in her investigation of corporate governance practices that some governance techniques, such as raising the proportion of outsiders on the board, were more successful at deterring white-collar crime than other governance structures. Last but not least, studies have revealed that some CEO remuneration plans may promote financial fraud and risk-taking, raising the possibility of a disaster (Wowak et al, 2015).

The internal perspective's emphasis on organizational readiness yields three components: Initially, it's frequently thought of as a cognitive and behavioral effort when organizing for high reliability. Second, a number of research indicate that companies with high reliability are better able to avert disasters. Finally, other elements like corporate culture and structure may have an impact on the risk of a crisis. It can be assumed that the structural and cultural variables raising the chance of a crisis also make it more challenging to organize for reliability, even though this has not been formally investigated. Future study has a great opportunity to test this notion. For instance, researchers might look at how various governance or remuneration schemes affect the process of arranging for dependability. We also point out that research on organizational preparation in general and high-reliability companies in particular has been criticized for lacking specificity (Leveson et al, 2009).

Precrisis research from an external perspective emphasizes the importance of stakeholder connections, in contrast to internal

research that focuses on organizational preparedness. Within this field, we found two streams that concentrate on, respectively, positive and negative relationships.

**Positive connections.** According to precrisis studies from an external perspective, keeping good ties with stakeholders can lessen the likelihood of a crisis (Pfarrer et al, 2008). For instance, in order to improve crisis identification and prevention, Clair and Waddock (2007: 299) developed a whole responsibility management strategy that placed emphasis on the significance of acknowledging an organization's duties to stakeholders (Alpaslan et al, 2009). A similar line of reasoning was used by Kahn and colleagues (2013) when they proposed that relationship cohesiveness, adaptability, and open communication between internal and external stakeholders can aid in crisis prevention. Coombs (2015: 107) concluded by saying that stakeholders should be part of the prevention thinking and process and that they may assist in both identifying and reducing the risks that could result in a crisis.

Although this field of inquiry has a wide range of theoretical approaches, empirical studies are still few. Few research have specifically looked at the relationship between good stakeholder relations and the risk that a crisis would arise, even though some studies show that it can reduce the potential damage from a crisis. Future studies, for instance, might look at the connection between a company's social responsibility and the possibility of a catastrophe. That example, if having good stakeholder connections is measured by cardiogenic shock prognosis (CSP), then firms with higher CSP scores should, on average, face fewer crises.

**Adverse stakeholder interactions.** Several researchers have thought about the negative aspect of stakeholder relationships in



contrast to the optimistic approach described above. For instance, Mishina et al (2010) discovered that prior successful organizational performance raises stakeholders' expectations for future successful performance and that organizations may commit crimes to live up to these expectations (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). This societal pressure is an illustration of the strain theory which holds that actors turn to misconduct when they are unable to accomplish their objectives through legal means. As a result, the demands put on an organization to meet stakeholder expectations may drive actions that could trigger a crisis (Bundy et al, 2017).

Moreover, academics have thought about how bad relationships with stakeholders may result in retaliatory action, such as protests, activism, boycotts, and legal action. For instance, McDonnell and King (2013) investigated the impact of an organization's good and bad ties in the setting of consumer boycotts, and James et al (2006) analyzed negative relationships in the context of discrimination litigation.

The emphasis placed by the external perspective on stakeholder interactions at the stage of crisis prevention implies the following: Building strong stakeholder connections is crucial because strained ties can start or exacerbate crises. In order to prevent the pressure brought on by unattainable aspirations, positive relationships must also be built on a foundation of acceptable expectations and open channels of communication. Building such a foundation is likely the duty of both organizations and stakeholders, with stakeholders needing to be aware of inflated expectations and associated biases while stakeholders needing to concentrate on controlling expectations and communicating clearly (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015). Of course, while controlling expectations may aid in crisis

prevention, doing so may have detrimental effects on organizational effectiveness. For instance, measures to manage expectations may be viewed unfavorably by shareholders, especially following strong success. As a result, future study has a chance to look at possible trade-offs between an organization's attempts to control stakeholders' expectations, crisis risk, and financial success.

### **Synthesizing the Perspectives**

There are several similarities between the internal perspective's emphasis on organizational readiness and the external perspective's emphasis on stakeholder interactions. For instance, building management mindfulness by organizing for reliability is a process that is typically centered on the internal operating environment. The same goes for research on stakeholder relationships, which highlights the significance of being aware of commitments and expectations in interpersonal connections. Both viewpoints emphasize the need to recognize the behavioral and social barriers that could prevent thoughtful planning and relationship formation (e.g., biases, limitations, and expectations).

Despite these similarities, there is little study that takes both perspectives into account (Kahn et al., 2013). Future research questions are still open as a result. How, for instance, may efforts to structure for dependability affect how a company handles its connections with external stakeholders? We are aware that focusing on flexibility and essential responsibilities is necessary for organizing for dependability (Weick et al., 1999). Additionally, both of these qualities are essential for healthy stakeholder relationships (Ulmer et al., 2011). Hence, it would seem that fostering positive relationships

with external stakeholders would improve an organization's ability to structure for reliability and that the existence of these relationships would do the same.

Yet, by taking into account managers' bounded rationality and cognitive constraints, an other approach emerges (Bundy et al, 2017). The ability of executives to cultivate a wide range of beneficial stakeholder connections may be constrained if they are concentrating on creating internal structures to manage complicated systems. Similar to this, managers preoccupied with their many stakeholders could find it difficult to concentrate on overseeing intricate internal processes. As a result, it's probable that it may be challenging to achieve a balanced focus on internal and external crisis prevention in real life.

## **Crisis Management**

After the precrisis prevention stage, a sizable amount of internal and external research has concentrated on the procedures connected with the crisis management stage. Before examining the distinctions between the internal and external viewpoints, we point out that organizational readiness and strong stakeholder connections, which work to avert crises, may also make it easier to handle crises following a triggering event. Many of the manuscripts examined above can therefore also be applied here.

Traditional crisis management techniques, according to Kahn (2013: 377), are based on a classical engineering mandate: find and rectify the issues with inputs and processes that result in subpar outputs. The internal perspective continues to emphasize a „fix-the-problem“ approach, frequently through focusing on

the variables that affect within-organization crisis leadership, even though crisis management research has mostly gone beyond this mandate. For instance, James and colleagues (2011: 458) emphasized the significance of „crisis handlers,“ emphasizing both the „responsibilities of leading an organization in the pre- and post-crisis phases“ in addition to the „tactical aspects of management“ during a crisis. They suggested that leaders who frame crises as opportunities are more open-minded and flexible while leaders who frame crises as threats react more emotionally and are more constrained in their efforts. The authors focused in particular on the relationship between crisis perceptions and crisis leadership (Bundy et al, 2017). Others have concentrated on the traits of the crisis leader and how such traits may affect internal cohesion throughout a crisis (James et al., 2011).

The management of crises by leaders at high-reliability organizations has also been studied, with the understanding that the capacity to adapt and shift mental models in an emergency situation can improve coordination and efficient communication. This shows that organizing for reliability can improve leadership efforts both before and after a crisis, in addition to helping to prevent them (Bundy et al, 2017).

Several conditional factors that could have an impact auf interne Leadership während einer Krise haben also been studied. For instance, Withers, a study proposed that a strong board might improve leadership efforts and lessen the impact of a crisis (Bundy et al, 2017). Similar findings discovered that businesses with autonomous, smaller boards—which are better able to implement dynamic change—were less likely to fail during a crisis. The authors also discovered that having CEOs with greater authority, who are

better able to act quickly, decreased the likelihood of failure (Bundy et al, 2017).

Beyond governance considerations, another study found that the complexity of an organization's structure and task environment together can have a favorable or negative impact on crisis management efforts (Bundy et al, 2017). Organizing for reliability and strategic flexibility both play important roles in crisis management and can strengthen leadership efforts, according to Lee and Makhija (2009). Others have thought about how more observable organization characteristics, such size and age, affect crisis management; the higher of these may hinder leadership efforts during a crisis (Lange & Washburn, 2012). Last but not least, researchers in corporate communication and public relations have recently started to concentrate on the importance of internal crisis communication, showing the detrimental effects of ignoring employees during a crisis as well as the positive effects of engaging with them, including the possibility of employees becoming outspoken defenders of the organization (Bundy et al, 2017).

According to the internal perspective, leaders are essential to the crisis management process and their capacity to lead is influenced by a variety of circumstances. On the other hand, research on crisis leadership is frequently criticized for its lack of clarity, much like the study on organizational readiness. The construction of organizational structures to facilitate information processing and resource allocation, for example, has not received significant empirical backing, despite efforts to do so (Bundy et al, 2017). Further research is required to expand on current organizational theories of crisis management, and organizations' design principles for encouraging adaptability need to be reevaluated, according to

Lin and colleagues (2006: 611). In their analysis, they emphasized that important and detailed questions about the structure and coordination of organizations that might improve crisis leadership are still unresolved (Lin et al., 2006).

It is also unclear how various internal factors interact to affect crisis management. For instance, as we said before, research indicates that having a strong board and a strong CEO could improve internal crisis leadership. Strong boards, however, may attempt to limit CEO power, and strong CEOs frequently seek to minimize board impact. Also, according to research, powerful CEOs might take greater risks, which could increase the possibility of a catastrophe. As a result, paradoxically, the characteristics that lead to better internal crisis management may also result in more crises (Bundy et al, 2017).

### **External Perspective**

A lot of study from the external perspective has concentrated on how stakeholders perceive and respond to crises, as well as how companies affect these perceptions, in contrast to the concentration on internal crisis leadership. Following, we look at many aspects of this study. Our study includes a number of research that concentrate on how organizations use crisis response tactics, or the collection of coordinated communication and actions used to affect crisis perceptions among evaluators (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015). A large portion of this literature is based on the attribution hypothesis, which contends that people are driven to find the reasons behind unforeseen and unfavorable events, and that these attributions of blame can result in unfavorable feelings and reactions (Weiner, 1986). By using this reasoning, Coombs' situational crisis communication theory

(SCCT) contends that the more blame stakeholders place on an organization during a crisis, the more negative their impressions will be (Coombs, 1995, 2007; Coombs & Holladay, 2002). This premise is supported by experimental research, and several management studies have taken into account the function of crisis attributions by applying the principles of attribution theory and SCCT (e.g., Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015).

While research acknowledges that attributions are „a negotiated component of crisis management, and, therefore, prone to social influence,“ it also notes that they are „important for understanding stakeholders' perspectives of a crisis“ (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015: 352). As a result, the reaction plan of a company is crucial to this procedure. Many typologies have been created by academics to describe how corporations respond (e.g., Lamin and Zaheer, 2012; Zavyalova et al, 2012).

Given their commonalities, integrating them along a continuum from defensive to accommodating is a useful strategy. Response techniques that take less responsibility aim to lessen an organization's perceived association with a crisis, as stated by Bundy and Pfarrer (2015: 352). Denial, disobedience, and scapegoating are a few protective tactics. Apologies, sympathy gestures, and assurances of remedial action are a few examples of accommodating tactics. Decoupling and lowering offensiveness by using justifications and excuses are two examples of middle of the continuum methods.

The implications of time and the origin of the crisis reaction have both been studied. For instance, an empirical study has demonstrated that when an organization is the first to disseminate crisis information, negative views are minimized (Claeys & Cauberghe, 2012). Some researchers have demonstrated that businesses may use

anticipatory response tactics to moderate adverse emotions, such as combining unfavorable news with more favorable information (Graffin et al., 2016). Others have concentrated on stage models that highlight a company's reaction plan as a key component of reintegration (Bertels, Cody & Pek, 2014).

Last but not least, it is crucial to understand that crisis response strategies can include practical communication and actions, such as providing information to stakeholders to prevent harm, in addition to more symbolic management initiatives that aim to manage the organization's reputation in the public eye. Despite this acknowledgment, however, we rarely come across research that takes into account both an organization's verbal and behavioral responses. Instead, the vast majority of researchers, especially those that employ quantitative empirical designs, only pay attention to organizational actions that are directed at stakeholders or crisis communication. We also point out that a lot of the research in this area has not taken into account how stakeholders' biases, heuristics, and emotions affect how they perceive situations and how well response tactics work. But things are starting to shift. For instance, Jin and associates (Jin et al., 2012) have shown that stakeholders respond with various emotions that may affect a response strategy's effectiveness (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015).

The nature of the crisis being experienced is one of the crucial aspects affecting stakeholders' perspectives (Coombs, 2007). People classify crises into kinds as part of a "heuristic simplification process in which evaluators intuitively blend past experiences and expectations to compress the complicated nature of a crisis into easier-to-understand cognitive schemas," according to Bundy and Pfarrer (2015: 351). Similar to reaction tactics, this awareness has



led to the development of several typologies that concentrate on the situational aspects of the crisis, such as how controllable, severe, undesirable, and deliberate it is thought to be (e.g., Brown et al., 2016; Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015).

Endowed with favorable assessments. The number of positive ratings an organization has can also influence how stakeholders respond to emergencies (for example, reputation, legitimacy, status, social approval, and trust). Positive evaluations can operate as either a burden to raise negative opinions or as a buffer to minimize them, according to research (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015). When an organization acts as a buffer, stakeholders' positive feelings toward it may make it difficult to assign blame or temper unfavorable opinions. When a burden is present, the increased focus and expectations of stakeholders may result in unfavorable perceptions when those expectations are not met.

The buffer-versus-burden debate has ambiguous empirical support. The idea that positive social evaluations can protect organizations from unfavorable impressions is supported by some studies. For instance, Pfarrer et al. (2010) discovered that high-reputation and celebrity organizations experienced fewer market penalties than other organizations following a material negative earnings surprise. Coombs and Holladay (2001, 2006) discovered a negative correlation between stakeholders' perceptions of crisis responsibility and an organization's endowed reputation (McDonnell & King, 2013). However, other empirical studies have discovered that reputation and other social judgments may be burdensome (Graffin et al., 2013). For instance, Rhee and Haunschild (2006) discovered that reputable automakers suffered more consequences than other businesses after a product recall.

Many factors can be considered in explaining these contradictory results. The most likely explanation is that the relationship is conditional, with different social evaluations acting as both a burden and a buffer depending on certain factors, including the severity or type of crisis (McDonnell & King, 2013), an organization's response strategy (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015), an organization's history of crises, and heterogeneity among stakeholders (Lamin & Zaheer, 2012; Mishina et al., 2012). For instance, reputation was found to be a burden in the context of auto recalls. Perhaps the crisis's magnitude made it more likely that reputational harm would result. Pfarrer and colleagues (2010) discovered, however, that reputation served as a buffer in the case of unexpected revenues. Investors may have been more protected in this instance by reputation because they saw the infringement as less serious. Moreover, neither study took into account the organization's reaction plan, which might have had an endogenous impact on the results (among other potential factors). Research that takes into account the various factors influencing stakeholders' views is therefore required.

It has also been demonstrated that stakeholders' perceptions of a crisis are influenced by their level of affiliation with an organization (Zavyalova et al., 2016). For instance, high stakeholder identification with an organization may cause them to band together, but low stakeholder identification may cause them to blame the affected organization (Zavyalova et al., 2016). The advantage of strong identification, however, has been proven to diminish as a crisis worsens. Others have put more of an emphasis on identification-related processes. In their analysis of the Catholic Church, for instance, Gutierrez et al. (2010) described a split identification process that enables participants to support an organization normatively

while concurrently rejecting its methods and frameworks. In her analysis of the BP Gulf oil spill, Petriglieri (2015) found an analogous process in which organizational members reevaluate their affiliation with a crisis organization along specific pathways to reidentification or disidentification. Last but not least, Lange and Washburn (2012) thought about how stakeholders' identification with the persons that are harmed or the organization that is implicated can alter attributions, while Withers and colleagues (2012) looked at identification in predicting how directors react to a crisis.

According to research, influential stakeholders can have an impact on how other stakeholders see them. Social control agents, such as regulatory agencies, can affect how other stakeholders perceive crises. For instance, stakeholders might use their positions to influence public opinion through boycotts and protests. Also, the media are crucial in shaping how crises are seen. For instance, Graffin and colleagues (2013) demonstrated the value of the media in helping the general public understand a controversy. Also, research is starting to look at how social media can affect a company's crisis management efforts.

Crisis repercussions. Last but not least, a number of academics have focused on crisis spillovers, or when an innocent organization becomes polluted by a crisis as a result of similar traits, including industry participation. For instance, Barnett and King (2008) discovered that chemical spills from one firm harmed stakeholders' impressions of other industry participants, and Zavyalova and colleagues (2012) discovered that innocent organizations suffered more unfavorable headlines as a result of toy recalls by rivals. According to Zavyalova et al. (2012), defensive and ceremonial activities, as well as the presence of powerful governance and self-

regulatory institutions, might reduce this spillover impact. Shared organizational structures, high association, and geographic overlaps are just a few ways that organizational similarity might amplify this effect. Studies have also shown that the frequency of occurrence within a sector or in the larger environment can help to moderate stakeholders' perceptions of crises. Downsizing, option backdating, product recalls, and financial restatements have all been found to have this dampening effect (Bundy et al., 2016).

The research on stakeholder perceptions during the crisis management stage yields several conclusions: First, attributions are a major determinant of stakeholders' perceptions. Second, it has been stated and demonstrated by research that a company's response approach might affect stakeholders' perceptions. Finally, a number of additional factors also affect how people perceive crises (including the crisis type and endowed social evaluations, among others).

The fact that many of the studies are theoretical or case-based, and those that are empirical often take into account only one or a few of the characteristics mentioned above, has drawn criticism for this area of the research, as it has for other sections of the literature. As a result, we still lack thorough knowledge of the "whole picture." An emphasis on managing perceptions may divert attention from more practical parts of crisis management, such as identifying and resolving underlying issues, and this focus may also increase organizational defensiveness, according to the normative criticism of this research (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015). In the section following on Future Research Development, we take into account both of these concerns.

There are similarities between the internal and external views'

approaches to crisis management. For instance, a crucial finding from both angles is that a crisis reduces the cognitive capacity of managers and stakeholders. The emotional responses that come along with a crisis may result in pessimism, defensiveness, feelings of trauma and betrayal, ignorance, and grief, which have also been highlighted by both views. Such responses exacerbate efforts at internal and external coordination, making crisis management more challenging.

In conclusion, the internal and external views concentrate on several elements that may affect the ability to make sense of events in a crisis. Yet, one significant distinction between the perspectives is that the internal perspective emphasizes managers' efforts to make sense of the crisis, whereas the external perspective emphasizes stakeholders' sensemaking and perceptions. But, similar to the time of precrisis prevention, we only observe sporadic attempts at integration (Bundy et al, 2017). Thus, there are several opportunities. For instance, crisis management techniques are probably more successful when combined with serious internal efforts to address the issues that caused the crisis. Therefore, effective leadership for internal audiences will likely result from effective leadership for external stakeholders, and vice versa (Bies, 2013). For instance, a company that shows compassion to people in need might inspire and make its employees feel proud of themselves. In the section below, under "Future Research Development," we take into account these and other possibilities (Bundy et al, 2017)

## Postcrisis Outcomes

We are now considering post-crisis consequences after the crisis management phase. While the external perspective has generally focused on social assessments, research from the inside has primarily concentrated on organizational learning. As was already noted, it's critical to understand that elements related to earlier stages can also affect how a crisis plays out. So, a large number of the manuscripts evaluated in Stages 1 and 2 are also relevant here.

Organizational learning is emphasized by the internal perspective as a crucial crisis consequence as part of its focus on dependability and leadership. For instance, James and colleagues (2011) emphasized the significance of changing the status quo in order to create new chances for competition by learning from a crisis. The language of renewal theory put out by Ulmer and colleagues (2011) emphasizes the possibility of opportunity, renewal, and progress as a result of crisis management. Following, we look at a few components of this literature.

Learning was defined as an intentional and emergent process that might concentrate on both the event itself and the growth of organizational capacities outside of the crisis event. Learning from catastrophes is difficult, though. On the one hand, a concentration on accumulating new knowledge might be sparked by catastrophes. For instance, a study found that crises can boost people's motivation and probabilistic search for reasons and solutions, and Zahra and George (2002) contended that crises can boost people's capacity for absorption and capacity for learning. Having once dealt with a crisis lowers the risk of doing so again in the future (Bundy et al, 2017)

Yet, because they are uncommon and unanticipated, crises

can result in "erroneous assumptions" and resistance to learning. For instance, a crisis may lead to a dependence on preconceived notions and cognitive rigidity, which may hinder original thought and innovation. Similar to this, another study talked about how a catastrophe like a business failure can result in sadness, which prevents people from using the experience as a lesson. Finally, a study by Haunschild et al. (2015) have shown that the impacts of learning diminish over time and that crisis learning may prioritize some factors (like safety) above others (like innovation).

## CONCLUSIONS

Future studies might additionally take into account any conditional dependencies between different crisis stages. Researchers could concurrently look at the causes, severity, impact of vicarious learning, and responsibilities of leaders and other organizational members, as well as other aspects that affect crisis learning. As an alternative, the study hasn't yet empirically taken a company's crisis response plans into account. The reasons behind managers' decisions to be more defensive or accommodating still need to be studied. A configurational approach provides a chance to think about the variables that affect this choice. Despite its effects on stakeholders and organizations, research on crises and crisis management is still dispersed. This article have combined studies from several angles to provide consistency in the literature, and it has created a comprehensive framework to comprehend the crisis process. For academics interested in crises and crisis management, we have provided a number of potential future research topics as well as an extensive research agenda.

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